Was it recorded?
Known-audio fingerprint checks ask whether the expected test content reached a recording. That is evidence about a recording path—not the identity of a caller.
VOICE RISK / DEEPFAKE DEFENSE
Familiar audio is not sufficient authorization for a consequential instruction.
01 / THE THREAT MODEL
A caller who sounds familiar can still be making an unauthorized request.
The FBI has warned that criminals use AI-generated audio to impersonate contacts, elicit payments and obtain access to accounts. That is reason to assess the risk—not evidence of a specific attack rate on trading desks.
Use independently established contact details or an authenticated channel to verify consequential instructions. Do not let the same unverified call supply both the request and its proof.
Read the FBI public warning ↗02 / THREE SEPARATE QUESTIONS
Known-audio fingerprint checks ask whether the expected test content reached a recording. That is evidence about a recording path—not the identity of a caller.
Evaluate detection across codecs, noise, languages and unseen synthesis methods. Measure missed attacks and legitimate calls incorrectly flagged separately.
A real voice does not establish permission. Document the independent verification and approval needed before changing settlement details, access or payment instructions.
03 / CONTROL EXERCISES
A controlled exercise should end with evidence, not an unmanaged impersonation.
Design labeled synthetic-voice exercises around your firm’s controls. Before any evaluation, agree scope, source-audio rights, participant consent, approved channels and stop conditions.
04 / FIELD NOTES
A measured approach to synthetic-voice risk. Read the article →
NEXT / DEFINE THE TEST
Bring your recording architecture. Let’s define the right test.